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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY, a corporation,

Plaintiff .and Respondent,
Case No. 8378

-vs.R. W. STEWART,

Defendarnt

am Appell(J.J'nt.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

8T'ATEMENT OF THE CASE
On the 30th day of November, 19·53, appellant, as
purchaser, and A. W. Cheney and Effie S. Cheney, his
wife, as sellers, executed and delivered a contract, commonly known as an Earnest Money Receipt, under the
terms of which appellant agreed to purchase, and the
Cheneys agreed to sell, a certain farm in Davis County,
Utah, for·a total sale price' of $23,647.80, payable as follows:
"Arrangements to pay banks in the amounts
set forth amounting to $17,647.80, also $6000.00
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payable to Ace Cheney, which is the total of the
purchase price as above."
Nowhere in the agreement are the banks referred
to named. Plaintiff, Continental Bank and Trust Company, hereinafter referred to as "Continental", claiming
as a third-party beneficiary under the agreement, alleging that it was one of the banks referred to in the contract, brought action against Stewart, the defendant and
appellant, for the sum of $6694.16. (R. 1) Defendant by
answer denied that Continental was one of the hanks referred to in the agreement. The Trial Court, sitting
without a jury, entered judgment in favor of Continental
and against the appellant for the sum of $709'5.81, together with costs.
The seller, Cheney, testified that at the time the
contract was executed it was agreed that appellant would
assume obligations owing to the Barnes Banking Company in the amount of approximately $11,420.00, and to
Continental in the amount of $6280.00. The appellant
Stewart testified that he agreed to pay obligations owing
to Barnes Banking Company of Kaysville and Valley
State Bank of Salt Lake City; that the obligations which
he was to pay were those secured by liens and mortgages
upon the land which he was purchasing, and that he understood that the total amount of the secured obligations
was the sum of $17,647.80, although the same was not
itemized for him. The obligations owing hy Cheney to
Oontinental were unsecured.
At the time of the execution of said agreement there
were notes owing by Cheney to Barnes Banking Com-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

m.

3
pany, secured by mortgages upon his real property,
totaling approximately $11,350.00, and there was a norte
owing by Cheney to Valley State Bank upon his real
property and some cattle secured by a mortgage to Valley
State Bank in the amount of approximately $4,132.00, a
total of approximately $15,482.00. These were the only
obligations secured by liens or mortgages upon the real
property. Thus, for appellant to obtain clear title to the
real property which he purchased, he was obliged to pay
approximately $15,482.00, in payment of notes secured
by mortgages upon the land. He deeded land in Texas
to Cheney in lieu of a cash paJinent of $6000.00. If he is
required to pay the judgment granted in this case·, the
total cost of the farm to appellant will be approximately
$28,577.00 instead of the sum of $23,647.80, which appel}ant agreed to pay as the full purchase price thereof.
The appellant contended that the obligation which
he was to pay to banks were those secured by liens and
mortgages upon the real property. In his oral testimony
Cheney denied that the obligations to be paid were those
secured by liens and mortgages. However, four· days
after the execution of the Earnest Money Receipt Cheney
and Stewart signed an agreement, Exhibit 3-D, which
recited:
"That whereas Asahel W. Cheney and Robert
W. Stewart have heretofore executed an agreement for the sale and purchase of a farm in Kaysville together with the personal property located
thereon, and Robert W. Stewart has agreed to
pay therefor the sum of $6000.00 and assume all
obligations secured by liens or mortgages uporn
the real prop-erty." (Italics ours)
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On March 2'5, 1954, fifteen days after the complaint
in this cause was filed, a Sum1nons and copy of Complaint
was served upon the appellant in the case of A. ,V. Cheney
v. R. W. Stewart, Exhibit 2-D, in which complaint A. W.
Cheney alleged:

"1. That on the 30th day of November, 1953,
defendant entered into a written agreement with
plaintiff for the purchase by defendant of real
property owned by plaintiff located in Davis
County, Utah, a copy of which agreement is attached hereto, marked Exhibit A, and by this reference made a part hereof, whereby defendant
undertook to pay $23,647.80 for said property,
payable $17,647.80 to banks holding various liens
and mortgages on said property and $6000.00 to
plaintiff.
''2. That prior to the execution of said agreement plaintiff and defendant had agreed, in considera,tion of said purchase and sale and in consideration of plaintiff's investigation and possible
purchase by plaintiff of land in Texas owned by
defendant, that defendant should pay plaintiff the
sum of $25,647.80, payable $17,647.80 to banks
hold~ng various liens and 'mortgages on the Davis
Cownty, Utah, property, and $8000.00 to plaintiff,
$2000.00 to be paid in cash to plaintiff prior to
plaintiff's departure for Texas on or about November 30, 1953." (Italics ours)
One of the points relied upon by the defendant for
a reversal of the judgment is that the judgment is not
supported by sufficient, competent evidence, and it is
manifest that the findings and judgment of the trial
court are so clearly against the weight of the evidence as
to indicate a misconception of or lack of consideration
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of the evidence. It is, therefore, necessary to review the
evidence offered and received at the trial.
The only witness called by Continental was A. W.
Cheney, who testified as follows:
That because of his wife's sickness, he had been
forced to borrow until it appeared he would lose his farm,
and that he listed the same with Mr. C. Ed Lewis for sale;
that he met Mr. Stewart, and that they two signed the
agreement, Exhibit 1, heretofore referred to. (R. 6) That
he, Stewart and Mr. Bell, the real estate agent, held a
conversation at the home of Cheney about three days
prior to the date of the agreeinent. (R. 7-9) That he told
Mr. Stewart and Mr. Bell that he owed Barnes Bank
eleven thousand four hundred twenty some odd dollars,
and that he owed Continental because they had put up
money for remodeling his house, ( R. 9), and Stewart
told him he would personally take care of the obligation
to Continental and see it was paid. (R. 10) That he had
received a statement from Continental the day before
and he gave the amount of the obligation to Mr. Stewart;
that he read the statement from Mr. Steffensen of the
Bank, and that it was $6280.00. (R. 10) That all the notes
owing to the Barnes Bank, totaled $11,420.00. That subsequently on the date when the contract was signed Bell
and Stewart called again at the home, at which time Bell
rehearsed the agreement asking Stewart if he understood he was to pay the Barnes Bank $11,420.00, and that
he was to pay Continental $6280.00, to which he answered
"yes," and he would take care of them personally. Bell
asked Stewart if he also understood that he was to pay
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Cheney $6000.00, or give hin1 sOine property in Texas
equivalent to $6000.00, to which Stewart answered ''yes";
that before signing the agreernent the said sun1s were
totaled, making twenty-three thousand six hundred and
some odd dollars. The agreement, Exhibit 1, was then
signed. (R. 13) That about four or five days after the execution of the agreement a deed to the property being
sold was delivered to Stewart, and that the other items
mentioned in Exhibit 1 were transferred to Stewart. (R.
14) That Stewart transferred title to the property in
Texas to Mr. Cheney in lieu of the $6000.00 cash. (R. 15)
That Stewart had not paid the indebtedness to Continental. Continental sued Cheney and obtained a judgment.
That later while in court on a supplemental proceeding,
Cheney showed the sales agreement to Judge Ellett. He
turned to the Bank's attorneys and told them this was
a bona fide agreement and for them to look to Mr. Stewart for the money. (R. 15)
On cross examination Cheney stated that the obligation owed to Continental was not a lien on the property,
and that he was fully aware of that fact at the time the
negotiations were conducted. (R. 16) T~hat the Continental obligation was about the only unsecured obligation
he owed. (R. 17) That he did not say while he was conducting negotiations with Bell and Stewart that he owed
some obligation to Continental, but it was not a lien, and,
therefore, would not be considered in the transaction.
(R. 17) That it was not the understanding between him
and Stewart that other than the $6000.00 that the obligations which Stewart was to pay were those secured by
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liens and mortgages upon the property. (R. 18) Cheney
was then asked if he had ever seen the lawsuit which he
had filed against Stewart, to which he answered, "yes";
and that he gave the information contained in the complaint to his attorney, Mr. Greenwood. Defendant's Exhibit 2-D was then offered and received pro forma. (R.
18)
redirect examination Cheney testified that the
Valley State Bank obligation, concerning which he had
testified, was secured by a Chattel Mortgage on the cows,
but was not secured by a mortgage on the land; that the
original amount of s·aid obligation was $3600.00, and that
there was owing on that obligation on November 30th
between twenty-two and twenty-three hundred dollars.
(R.19).

On

Thereupon the respondent rested.
Appellant then called Mr. E. Earl Greenwood, Jr.,
who testified that he was a practicing attorney, and that
he prepared a Smnmons and Cornplaint in the case of
A. W. Cheney v. R. W. Stewart, and that said complaint
was defendant's proposed Exhibit 2-D; that the complaint
was prepared upon information furnished to him by Mr.
Cheney. (R. 21) The following portion of the cOinplaint
was then read to the witness:
"That on the 30th day of November, 1953,
defendant entered into a written agreement with
plaintiff for the purchase by defendant of real
property owned by plaintiff located in Davis
County, Utah, copy of which agreement is attached
hereto, marked Exhibit A, and by this reference
made a part hereof, whereby defendant undertook
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to pay $23,647.80 for said property payable $17,647.80 to hanks holding various liens and mortgages upon said premises."
The witness was then asked if that was the information
furnished by Mr. Cheney. Upon objection to the question
the Court asked if Counsel proposed the question as impeachment, to which Counsel answered, "yes." The Court
then stated that Mr. Cheney had not been asked any impeaching questions, to which Counsel replied tliat he had
attempted to ask the questions, but had been ruled out
by the Court. The witness was then dismissed.
Cheney was recalled and was asked whether at the
time he gave Mr. Greenwood the information from which
he prepared the complaint of A. W. Cheney against R.
W. Stewart he told Mr. Greenwood that the contract provided for the payment by Mr. Stewart of obligations secured by liens and mortgages upon his property. He
stated he did not remember that part of it at all. (R. 23)
He was asked whether in connection with the $17,000.00
he discussed whether or not the obligations were secured
by liens and mortgages. He answered that there was
$11,420.00 secured by mortgage with the Barnes Bank,
and that Stewart agreed to pay the Continental Bank
$6280.00. He was then asked whether or not the full
obligation was represented by obligations secured by liens
and mortgages upon the property. He answered that he
did not remember the liens and mortgages part of it, and
when pressed for an answer he denied making the statement. He stated he did not remember, and when asked
whether he thought he might have told Mr. Stewart that,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

he stated that he would leave that up to the intelligence of
his attorney. (R. 24).
Mr. Marl Oakley Bell was then sworn and testified.
He stated he was employed by C. Ed Lewis, a real estate
broker, and that he conducted the negotiations between
Cheney and Stewart. (R. 25) That Cheney had slips of
paper showing his obligations, which they totaled up; that
there were three banks involved upon which he had slips,
one of them was the Valley State Bank, the other was the
Barnes Bank, and then Cheney mentioned the Continental
Bank, but that Continental did not have a lien on the
property. (R. 27) That the figures were furnished by
Cheney; that he took the Valley Bank and the Barnes
Bank figures, (R. 30) ; that he just recollected there were
the two Banks, the Barnes Bank and the Valley Bank,
(R. 31), and that they had liens on the property. (R. 31)
That he thought the only figures he had were the secured
obligations, (R. 31), but he did not remember exactly
the indebtedness owing to the banks, but he thought the
whole obligation was sixteen thousand some odd dollars
that was secured by mortgage, (R. 32), and that the sum
included all of the mortgages against the property.
On cross examination he testified that he was only
interested in the liens on the property, and that his recollection was that the Barnes Bank and the Valley State
Bank were the only banks represented in the tabulation
of figures. (R. 34) That Continental was mentioned,
but it was mentioned as being unsecured. All of the
Banks, Valley Bank, Barnes Bank and ContinE-ntal Bank
were discussed, and it was mentioned that Continental
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Bank did not have a mortgage on the property. That
is all the witness re1nembered concerning the 1natter. (R.
34) The witness was asked if it was possible that Continental's indebtedness might have been included in the
tabulation even though it was understood it was not a secured obligation, to which the witness answered, it could
have been. On redirect examination the witness was
asked whether, according to his best recollection, the Continental obligation was included, and he answered that it
wasn't included. (R. 35)
Mr. W. E. Myrick was then sworn and testified that
he was an officer of the Valley State Bank, and that he
was acquainted with Stewart; that his Bank had had considerable dealings with Cheney beginning in 1950; that in
November, 1953, his Bank held a contract and a Chattel
Mortgage secured by crops and cattle. The Bank held a
mortgage upon the land of Cheney held by Utah Investment Company of which the witness was the Secretary.
( R. 36) The officers of the Valley State Bank and the
Utah Investment Company are the same. That Stewart
has paid off the obligations. (R. 37)
Defendant Robert Wilson Stewart was then sworn
and testified as follows :
Prior to signing the agreement he and Bell and
Cheney discussed the obligations due on the property
at Cheney's place. Cheney mentioned a number of places
where he was indebted. The witness remembered especially the Barnes Bank and the Valley State Bank, and
he thought the Continental Bank could have been mentioned, hut he didn't remember. That he wanted only to
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assume the obligations that were against the real property; that he stated he would assume only the obligations
that were liens and mortgages against the real property.
(R. 42) Cheney mentioned the Barnes Bank, and he mentioned the Valley State Bank, and said he owed them so
much. He checked the records at the County Court House
and found that the obligations to the Barnes Bank was
secured. He found out that the obligation to the Valley
State Bank was secured. Cheney mentioned that he had
an obligation at the Continental Bank, but that it was not
secured. (R. 43) He was asked if he knew what obligations
were included in the sum of $17,647.00. He stated they
were not listed, not itemized; that .Mr. Cheney merely
stated he owed so much, giving the total, and the witnesses agreed to pay the Banks that total. (R. 44) That
on December 3rd, immediately after signing the contract,
the witness wanted a clarification from Cheney as to what
Banks were involved in the deal. (R. 44) That he and
Mr. Cheney then signed an agreement, Defendant's Exhibit 3-D. (R. 46) The witness testified that he said to
Cheney that he had agreed to pay to the banks a stipulated amount, which was the amount represented by
liens· and mortgages against the property, and Cheney
agreed with him. That Exhibit 3-D was drawn up to
confirm the agreement. (R. 49) Subsequently, the witness
had a conversation with Cheney in which he stated he had
found out that he owed the Barnes Bank so much, the
Valley State Bank so much, and that he had an FHA
against the Continental, that all of the obligations totaled
between $28,000.00 and $29,000.00, and that he had agreed
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to pay approximately $23,000.00, to which Cheney answered that Continental did not have a lien or mortgage
on the property. (R.. 50) That he did not ever agree with
Cheney to pay the Continental obligation. (R. 51)
On cross exmnination Stewart testified as follows:
That he ha~ signed the Earnest Money Receipt and
given it to Bell, and that he was not present when Cheney
signed the same. (R. 53) That a day or two before the
Earnest Money Receipt was signed he had been out to
Cheney's place with Bell. (R. 54) He agreed to pay so
much money, but did not know what banks he owed to
or exactly how much. (R. 55) Prior to the signing of the
agreement he knew that so much was owing to the Valley
State Bank, so much was owing to the Barnes Bank, the
Continental was 1nentioned and skipped because it wasn't
a lien against the property. (R. 56) That prior to signing
the agreement the witness, Bell and Cheney sat down and
discussed the property with the obligations against it.
He remembered that certain amounts were given by
Cheney as representing the loans and mortgages against
the real property. He was present at that time, which was
a day or two before the Earnest Money Receipt was
signed. (R. 59) Cheney mentioned that he owed certain
amounts secured by a mortgage on cattle, that he wasn't
going to buy the cattle, so the mortgage against the
cattle made no difference. That he had two mortgages
against the cattle, one against the cattle only, the other
a mortgage upon the cattle and the land. (R. 61) That
when he agreed to pay the banks which had liens upon
the property, he knew the Valley State Bank had a lien
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against the property. (R. 62) He knew that the Valley
State Bank had a mortgage on the cows, which mortgage
was also against the land. Cheney had told him so. (R.
64) That the Valley State Bank mortgage on the cows,
the Barnes Bank mortgage on the land and the Valley
State Bank mortgages on the cows and land were discussed with the witness. (R. 66) That the obligation to
Continental was briefly passed over. It was mentioned
as an obligation that wasn't a lien- on the property. (R.
67) The witness then stated he didn't remember whether
or not the Continental Bank obligation was discussed at
the conversation prior to the signing of the agreement.
That the obligation secured by the mortgage on the cows
alone wasn't a part of the deal for the payment of indebtedness owing to the banks. (R. 69) That the mortgages he was to pay were the Barnes Bank land mortgage, and the Valley State mortgage on the land and the
cows. (R. 69) That after the Earnest Money Receipt was
signed defendant went into the Continental Bank shortly
thereafter. Before he signed the obligation he knew
there was a debt to the Continental Bank, like he knew
about Cheney's doctor bill and his bill for his furniture.
(R. 71) He went into the Bank after the meeting at Mr.
Iverson's office on December 3rd, and he found out about
the amount of the indebtedness. He did not make any
arrangements to pay the indebtedness. He needed finances for the place, and he saw Mr. Stevens about financing the place. (R. 72) That no financing was extended to him. (R. 72) Before going to Mr. Iverson's office he had gone to the Valley State Bank and the Barnes
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Bank and their obligations totaled a little less than $17,000.00, which obligations did not include the Continental
Bank obligation. (R. 76) That he agreed to pay a certain
indebtedness owing to banks on liens against the property, but the specific amount wasn't broken down as to
how much to pay one hank or how much to pay another
bank. (R. 81) That before he signed the Earnest Money
Receipt he talked to Mr. Gailey of the Barnes Bank. (R.
85) He knew what the indebtedness was to Barnes Bank
before he signed the Earnest Money agreement. (R. 87)
That the amount which he learned from the Barnes Bank
was owing and the amount that Cheney had told him was
owing to the Barnes Bank were not the same. (R. 87)
That he checked the liens at the County Court House
and the amount of the liens were not more than he had
agreed to pay. (R. 89) The other obligation he was going
to pay besides the Barnes Bank was the Valley State
Bank. (R. 90)'
Mr. John R. Gailey was then sworn and testified as
follows:
That he is the President of Barnes Banking Company
of Kaysville, and has been connected with the Bank for
fifty-eight years; that over a number of years he had a
series of transactions with Cheney. The witness was
asked if he had a record of the obligations that were
owing by Cheney to the Bank in 1953. ( R. 91) He stated
they had one note dated August 16, 1944, on which there
remained an unpaid balance of $4970.50, upon which the
interest had been paid to November 16, 19·52. That note
was secured by a first mortgage on the real estate and
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water right owned by Mr. Cheney. He had another note
that had been paid down to $4080.00, and a new note of
$6000.00 that was secured by a mortgage dated August
13, 1953. ( R. 92) On November 30, 1953, he had sold to
the Valley State Bank the $4480.00 note, which had been
reduced to $4080.00. The sale of that note was made to
the Valley State Bank in November for $4080.00, plus
$40.00 interest, or a total of $4120.00. HP. had agreed to
sell the $6000.00 note to :Mr. Myrick of the Valley State
Bank, which was to be picked up and paid for within one
year. The date of the $6000.00 note was August 13, 1953.
The interest owing on the $4970.00 note on November 30,
1953, would be the interest from November 16, 1952, at
6%. (R. 93) The interest owing on the $6000.00 note would
be interest at 6% from August 13, 1953. On November 30,
1953, the Barnes Banking Company still held in its bank
the $6000.00 note and the $4970.00 note, and had sold and
delivered to the Valley State Bank on the 13th of N ovember, 1953, the note for $4080.00 upon which there was
$40.00 interest. (R. 94) All three of the notes were secured by mortgages on real property. (R. 94-95) The
note for $4080.00, which had been sold to Valley State
Bank, was a second mortgage and also included a mortgage upon some cattle. That prior to the time he made
his deal with Cheney, Mr. Stewart went to the Barnes
Bank to discuss the matter of the mortgages owing
by Mr. Cheney. (R. 95)
On cross examination Mr. Gailey testified that
nothing had been paid on the $6000.00 note and it was
secured by a real estate mortgage which was second to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
the real estate mortgage securing the $4970.50 note.
The note for $4080.00 was secured by the same mortgage
as the note for $6000.00. One mortgage covered both
notes. He had so~d the $4480.00 and the $6000.00 notes
to the Valley State Bank. The Valley State Bank had
paid $4080.00 plus interest for the one note, and had obligated itself and promised to pay for the $6000.00 note.
The Valley State Bank had not yet paid the $6000.00. (R.
96) The mortgage securing the $6000.00 note wouldn't
be released without payment of both the $6000.00 and the
$4000.00 notes. If Mr. Cheney had gone ·to the Bank and
told Mr. Gailey that he wanted to pay the notes he had
with the Bank, he would have included all three notes.
(R. 97) That the records of the Bank on November 30,
1953, would show that there was owing to the Bank
$4970.00 plus interest, and $6000.00 plus interest, which
would total something like $11,420.00, but that wasn't
what he would have taken to satisfy the mortgages. (R.
95)
On redirect examination Mr. Gailey was asked if all
of the obligations had been satisfied so far as the Bank
was concerned, and he answered : "Yes. We are not
claiming anything under them." (R. 99)
Mr. William E. Myrick was then sworn and testified
as follows:
The Utah Investment Company made a deal to
buy the second mortgage on the $4080.00 note and the
$6000.00 note, and at the time of the trial both the
$6000.00 and the $4900.00 note have been paid. (R. 100)
The notes were paid by Mr. Stewart. (R. 101-2)
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On cross examination n1r. Myrick testified that the
Utah Investment Company purchased the notes and mortgages from Barnes Banking Company. He is Vice President of Valley State Bank. On November 30, 1953, Valley State Bank held a note of :Mr. Cheney for $3600.00
original amount, which had been paid down to $2860.00
as of November 30, 19·53.
On redirect examination Mr. Myrick stated he was
Secretary of the Utah Investment Company and the active Agent of that Company in transacting its business,
(R. 102), and that the office of the Utah Investment Company is in the Valley State Bank office. ( R. 105)
Thereupon the appellant rested.
The Court found that the "Banks" referred to in the
Agreement of Sale and Purchase executed by Cheney and
his wife, as sellers, and Stewart, as buyer, were Continental and Barnes Bank, and that the "amount" referred to
in said Agreement was the amount due and owing said
banks on November 30, 1953, and that in consequence of
the failure of Stewart to pay Continental the amount due
on November 30, 1953, judgments were rendered against
Cheney and his wife in favor of Continental in the total
amount of $6694.16. (R. 110)
The Court entered Conclusions of Law to the effect
that on November 30, 1953, defendant Stewart entered
into a contract with Cheney and his wife for the benefit
of Continental by the terms of which Stewart agreed to
pay to Continental the sum of $6280.00 in consideration
of the transfer of real and personal property by Cheney
and his wife to Stewart, and that Stewart failed to make
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payment to Continental contrary to the terms of the
Agreement, and as a consequence judgments were entered
against Cheney and his wife in the amount of $6694.16,
(R. 110-111), and that the difference between $669·4.16
and $6280.00 was represented by addrtional charges
assessed against Cheney and his wife as a direct and foreseeable result of the failure of Stewart to perform the
obligations assu1ned by him under said Agreement and
that Continental is entitled to judgment against Stewart
in the amount of $6694.16, together with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from the date of the institution
of this action, March 10, 1954, in the sum of $401.65. (R.
111)
Upon these Findings and Conclusions the Court entered judgment in favor of Continental and against
Stewart in the sum of $7095.81. (R.112)
To the foregoing Findings, Conclusions and J udgment appellant filed a Motion to Amend and Strike Portions of said Findings, Conclusions and Judgment upon
the ground that the same were not supported by the evidence. (R. 113)
Appellant also filed a Motion for New Trial. (R.118)
Appellant's motions aforesaid were denied. (R. 115)
This appeal is prosecuted from the judgment so entered and the whole thereof.

STATEl\fENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN THE
SUM OF $7095.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE. '
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POINT II
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF.
POINT III
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
PREVAIL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF CONTINENTAL IN THE
SUM OF $7095.81 AND THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
IN SUPPORT THEREOF ARE WHOLLY UNSUPPORTED BY
THE EVIDENCE.

The Court concluded that Continental was entitled
to judgment against the appellant in the sum of $6694.16,
with interest at the rate of 6o/o per annum from the date
of the filing of the action in the amount of $401.65, making a total of $7095.81. (R. 111) As to the interest part
of the judgment, appellant would not complain if the conclusion that Continental was entitled to judgment against
appellant in the amount of $6694.16 principal were supported by the evidence. But it is not. The only evidence
that plaintiff adduced as to the amount owed by Cheney
to Continental, and which it asserts Stewart agreed to
assume and pay is the oral evidence of Cheney that he
owed Continental $6280.00 on November 30, 1953. (R.
12-13) Just before plaintiff rested plaintiff's Counsel
made the following statement:
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"The amount, Your Honor, of the indebtedness between Cheney and Stewart is admitted in
the . answer to be $6694.16, and, calling Your
Honor's attention to that fact, the plaintiff will
rest." (R. 20)
This statement of Counsel is incorrect. (R. 2) Defendant
in his Answer admitted that Cheney was indebted to Continental in the sum of $6694.16 on the date of the filing
of plaintiff's complaint, March 10, 19·54. (R. 2) However, an admission that Cheney was indebted to Continental in the amount of $6694.16 on the lOth day of March,
1954, certainly is not an admission that appellant was indebted to Cheney in that amount. Assuming for sake of
argument that Cheney owed Continental $6280.00 on
November 30, 19'53, and assuming that Stewart agreed
to pay Cheney's obligation of $6280.00 to Continental,
which appellant denies, there is nothing in the record to
sustain the finding that Stewart owed Continental
$6,694.16 on April 9, 1954. Interest from November 30,
1953, on $6280.00 at the rate of 6% per annum, (if such
was the rate of interest that Cheney was to pay), would
be approximately $104.66. The total amount due on
March 10, 1954, would be $6280.00 principal, plus $104.66
interest, a total of $6384.66.
To support the judgtnent the Court found:
''As a consequence of the failure of defendant,
R. W. Stewart to pay plaintiff, The Continental
Bank and Trust Company, the amount due on
November 30, 1953, judgments were entered
against A. W. .Cheney and Effie S. Cheney in
favor of plaintiff, The Continental Bank and Trust
Company, in the total amount of $6694.16." (R.

110)
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A search of the record will disclose that not a word of
evidence was adduced as to how the amount of $6694.16
was established.
The Court concluded as follows:
''The difference between $6694.16 and $6,280.00,
was represented by additional charges assessed
against A. W. Cheney and Effie S. Cheney
as a direct and foreseeable result of the failure
of the defendant, R. W. Stewart to perform the
obligations assumed by hun under said agreement." (R. 111)
Again, a check of the record will disclose that not one
word of evidence was adduced on the matter of the difference between $6694.16 and $6280.00. Thus, the judgment against Stewart is wholly unsupported by any evidence.
Appellant calls attention of the Court to the affidavit of appellant's Counsel, which stands uncontradicted
in the record, to the effect that subsequent to the trial of
this cause the files and records of the Third Judicial
District Court were checked and disclosed the following
facts:
That Continental filed two suits on December 16,
1953, and two suits on January 4, 1954, again~t Cheney.
Judgments were entered on the suits filed on December
16, 1953, on January 19, 1954. On the suits filed January
4, 1954, judgments were entered on January 29, 1954.
The total amounts of principal and interest included in
all four judgments was $5990.96. (R. 116)
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POINT II
THE FINDING THAT APPELLANT AGREED TO PAY
THE OBLIGATION OWED BY CHENEY TO CONTINENTAL
IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT THEREOF.

Appellant is aware of the rule that this Court will
not weigh evidence and will sustain a judg1nent in a law
actiDn if the same is supported by competent, substantial evidence. But, as the Court said in Jensen v. Howell,
75 Utah 64, 282 P. 1034, 1037:
"In this jurisdiction the binding effect of findings of a trial court in law cases is different from
that in equity cases. In the former, the findings,
as a general rule, are approved if there is sufficient competent evidence to support them and
. ordinarily, are not disturbed, unless it is manifest
that they are so clearly against the weight of the
evidence as to indicate a misconception, or not a
due consideration of it."
This Court in the recent case of Seybold v. Union
Pac. R. R. Co., 239 P. (2d) 174, reversed the findings of
the jury, and in that case stated:
''If there is any substantial, competent evidence upon which a jury acting fairly and reasonably could make the finding, it should stand. But if
the finding. is so plainly unreasonable as to convince the court that no jury acting fairly and
reasonably could make such a finding, it cannot be
said to be supported by substantial evidence.''
Appellant submits that applying the rule laid down
in Seybold v. Uruion Pac. R. R. Co., next supra, the findings of the trial judge are_ so plainly unreasonable as to
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be convincing that the court did not act fairly and reasonably in making his finding, that Stewart agreed to pay
the obligation owed by Cheney to Continental, and, therefore, his findings and the judgment thereon are not supported by substantial evidence.
The only evidence that could be said to support the
finding that appellant agreed to pay the obligations owed
by Cheney to Continental is found in the oral testimony
of Cheney. He testified that prior to the signing of the
agreement he told Stewart and Bell, the real estate agent,
that he owed the Barnes Bank eleven thousand four hundred twenty some odd dollars, and that he owed Continental, because they had put up money for remodeling his
house, and Stewart told him he would personally take care
of the obligation to Continental, (R. 9-10); that he had
received a statement from Continental the day before
from :Mr. Steffensen of that Bank, and he gave Stewart
the amount of the obligation which he had received from
Mr. Steffensen. (R. 10) Cheney further testified that on
the day the contract was signed Bell and Stewart called
at his home at which time Bell rehearsed the agreement,
asking Stewart if he understood he was to pay the Barnes
Bank $11,420.00, and that he was to pay Continental
$6280.00, to which Stewart answered "yes," and that he
would take care of the obligations personally.
Appellant submits that when considered in connection with the following, Cheney's testimony does not constitute substantial evidence:
(a)

Cheney was an interested witness and because
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of his interest and resulting bias his testilnony is of very
questionable value.
, (b) His testimony in support of the aforesaid finding and judgment is all oral.
(c) His oral testimony is contradicted by written
testimony.
(d) His actions subsequent to November 30, 1953,
do not accord with his oral testimony.
(e) His testimony is contradicted by Bell, a disinterested witness, and Stewart, an interested witness.
(f) Accepting his testimony results in a judgment
that is harsh, unfair and inequitable.
Cheney was an interested witness. It is obvious that
if he can shift the burden of the judgments which Continental obtained against him to Stewart, he stands to
benefit by so much. His testimony should, therefore, be
considered in the light of his interest.
As stated at 23 C.J. 46 Sec.1789:
"Interest or other bias of a witness may impair the weight of his testimony, whether it is
positive or negative and conversely the rubsence of
any interest or bias operates in favor of the witness."
As stated at 32 C.J.S.1065, Sec. 1026:
"The bias of a witness has a well known and
pernicious influence in quickening or deadening
his memory. This is especially true when he testifies to conversations with or oral statements made
by others."
This rule is well illustrated in the case at bar by the
answers of Cheney as recorded at R. 24, where, on being
pressed for a direct answer to the question of whether
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or not he had told his attorney, Mr. Greenwood, that he
had agreed on November 30, 1953, that the obligations
which were to be paid by Stewart were those secured by
liens and mortgages upon his farm, he was asked the
following questions, and gave the following answers:

"Q. Did you discuss whether or not the full obligation was represented by obligations secured
by liens or mortgages upon the property1
Answer yes or no.
A. I don't remember 'liens or Inortgages' part
at all.
Q. You don't remember that at all1
A. No.
Q. Do you deny you told him that~
A. No, I don't deny; I just don't remember.
Q. Do you think you may have told him that~
A. I would leave that up to the intelligence of my
attorney."
The foregoing testimony comes under the class of
evidence referred to in Footnote No. 53 to Sec. 1031, of
32 C.J.S. 1071:
''Evasive evidence of the 'I don't remember
class' is of doubtful probative force."
In the case of Holt v .Ind. Com., 96 Utah 484, 87 P.
(2d) 286, the Court stated that the fact that the parties
were interested in the outcome of the case was to be
considered in determining whether any weight should be
given their testimony relative to the ultimate fact which
determined their liability.
The credit to be given the testimony of an interested
witness was discussed in Montanya v. Brown, 84 P. (2d)
161, at 163, where the court said:
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''An exceedingly well considered case on the
question of credibility of interested witnesses
which arose in connection with evidence justifying
a directed verdict is that of J erke v. Dehnont State
Bank, 54 S.D. 446; 223 N.W. 585, 7:2 ALR 7. After
reviewing numerous cases throughout the United
States the court says, (page 591):
"'A majority of the courts, however, have announced other views on this question indicating
in substance the view that it is not a reasonable
thing to say, in general, that a witness has perjured himself or has testified falsely, either intentionally or unintentionally, merely because of an
interest in the case where his testimony is not
contradicted, is not opposed to general human experience, is not inherently improbable, and is not
put in question by other circumstances appearing
in the case.' ''
The testimony of Cheney is not supported by any
of the qualifications of reliable testimony of an interested party as set forth in the above quotation. His testimony is flatly contradicted by Stewart and Bell. It is
opposed to general human experience because anyone
who has had experience purchasing real property does
not buy property and agree to pay unsecured obligations of the seller with the purchase price, if the secured
and unsecured obligations exceed the purchase price.
Appellant stated he had had considerable experience in
dealing with real estate, (R. 67), and that he had checked
the records at the Court House to ascertain what liens
there were against the property. (R. 88-89) The testimony of Cheney is inherently improbable for the wbove
reasons. The testimony of Cheney is certainly put in
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•

question by other circumstances appearing in the case,
to wit: his written agreement of four days later, December 3, 1953, in which he stated the appellant was to pay
obligations secured by liens and mortgages on the property; four Inonths later Cheney's attorney filed a complaint in which the statement is twice made that appellant
was to pay obligations to Banks secured by liens and
mortgages; and by the facts that he apparently did not
report to Continental that appellant had agreed to make
payment of his obligations until several months after
suits had been filed by Continental against him and judgments had been obtained, and he was called into court
on a supplemental proceeding in connection therewith.
(R.15)
As stated before, Cheney's testimony, upon which
Continental must rely, is all oral. His oral testim·ony
is contradicted by his written agreement. In such case
oral testimony is accorded little or no probative weight.
In 23 O.J. 54, Sec. 1796, the text writer states:
"The triers of fact are not however bound to
accept the testimony of a single witness as true,
even though he is not contradicted, and the courts
have frequently held the testimony of a single
witness not to be such clear and convineing proof
as is required to sustain a verdict or finding
where it is offered for the purpose of varying or
contradicting a writing.''
It is true that in the case at bar the oral testimony
was not given for the purpose of directly varying a written instrument, but Cheney's oral testimony is contradicted by his written agreement of four days later. (Ex.
3-D)
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As the Court said in T,aylor v. Morris, 163 Cal. 717;
127 P. 66, at 68:
''But of course the court was not bound to accept this explanation; and it is well recognized
as a matter of law as well as of plain common
sense that an aceount of a transaction, given in a
contemporaneous writing when no differences
have arisen, is to be preferred to a subsequent
oral explanation at variance with the writing
given after differences have arisen."
To the same effect is the holding in the case of Smith
v. Goethe, 115 P. 223, 159 Cal. 628, where the Court said:
''The uncertain statements of Carmichael,
made years after the event under examination,
should not be permitted to prevail against the
formal written declaration of the parties made
at the time of the transaction and as part of it."
Again appellant calls attention to the complaint filed
on March 25, 1954, wherein Cheney's attorney in two
places stated in the complaint that the obligation which
appellant was to pay was "to banks holding various
liens and mortgages on said property."
'Cheney's actions subsequent to November 30, 1953,
do not accord with his oral testiinony. Cheney testified
that he had received a statement from Continental the
day before his conversation with Mr. Stewart and Mr.
Bell concerning the obligations that Cheney was to pay,
and that he read the statement from Mr. Steffensen of the
bank (Continental), and it was $6280.00. (R. 10) The
contract was signed on November 30, 1953. Cheney contended that the contract provided that appellant would
pay his obligations to Continental. Yet, on December 16,
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19·53, Continental sued Cheney on two notes and took
judgment thereon on January 19, 1954. Again on J anuary -+, 1954, Continental sued Cheney on two notes and
took judgments thereon on January 29, 1954. (R. 116)
Apparently Cheney failed to communicate the information to Continental that appellant had agreed to pay
his obligations to Continental, and Continental did not
learn thereof until Cheney, while in court on a supplemental proceeding, gave them the information. (R. 15)
In this same connection the signing of the agreement
December 3, 19·53, and the filing of the action by his attorney against Stewart should be considered.
Cheney's testimony is contradicted by Bell, a disinterested witness, and by Stewart, an interested witness.
Accepting Cheney's testimony results in a judgment
that is harsh, unfair and inequitable. As heretofore
pointed out the contract provided for the payment by appellant for the property of the sum of $23,647.80, "which
is the total of the purchase price as above." (Ex. 1-P)
Appellant deeded property to Cheney in Texas in lieu
of $6000.00 cash, which he had agreed to pay to Cheney,
(R. 15), and has paid obligations secured by mortgages
on the property totaling, with interest to November 30,
1953, approximately $15,482.62, (R. 94-95-96), a total of
approximately $21,482.62. If the judgment of the lower
court is affirmed, Stewart will be required to pay $6,280.00, plus interest and other items, concerning which we
have no evidence. The sum of said amounts which he has
paid, and will be obliged to pay, if the judgment is af-
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finned, not including interest and the other items, is approximately $27,762.62, approximately $4125.00 more
than he agreed to pay for the property. The beneficiary
of this injustice to appellant would be Continental, which
has not given one cent consideration therefor.
The rule announced in the case of Caine v. Hagenbarth, 106 P. 945, 37 Utah 69, that the interpretation of
an ambiguous contract, which is harsh, unfair and inequitable, should not be invoked. In that case the Court
reversed findings and judgment of the trial court. The
case was a law case apparently tried by the court without
a jury and had many of the same elements as the case
at bar. In that case at page 948 of 106 P., the Court
said:
"The case of Coghlan v. Stetson, (C.C.) 19
Fed. 727, affords a striking illustration of how
far courts are sometimes required to depart from
the mere dry words of the parties in their contracts in order to preserve their real intention and
to prevent injustice. Justice Cox, in speaking for
the court, in that case at page 729 says:
" 'The interpretation contended for by defendant is so harsh, so unfair, so wanting in reciprocity, that the court should not hesitate to reject it,
provided that the instrument is susceptible of any
reasonable construction. * * *If the language used
clearly establishes the defendant's version, it
would unquestionably be the duty of the court to
enforce it. But where the exact meaning is in
doubt where the language used is contradictory
and obscure, if there are two interpretations, one
of which establishes a comparatively equitaJble
contract and the other an unconscionable one, the
former construction should prevail.' "
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The court in the same case at page 953 said :
"We are further convinced that if such a
promise had been squarely demanded by respondents from appellant, he would have promptly refused to make it. l\1:oreover, the demand of respondents, in view of what they had to sell and
did sell, is unfair, unjust and wholly inequitable.
For this reason, if for no other, therefore, we may
invoke the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the opinion inN oonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall., where, at page 407, (19
L. Ed. 757), Mr. Justice Field states it in the following language :
" 'When an instrument is susceptible of two
constructions-the one working injustice and the
other consistent with the right of the case-that
should be favored which standeth with the right.'"
POINT III
AS A MATTER OF LAW APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO
PREVAIL.

There is one fact which is uncontradicted in the evidence: the total price to be paid for the land being sold
by Cheney was $23,647.80. (Ex. 1-P)
As heretofore pointed out, if appellant is required
to pay the judgment entered by the lower court, the total
cost to him of the property, including the secured obligations owing on November 30, 1953, which he has paid, are
$15,482.62, plus the $6000.00 represented by the land
deeded to Cheney in Texas, plus that part of the judgment which Cheney alleges was owing as of November
30, 1953, would be the amount of $27,762.62. These matters are uncontradicted.
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If Cheney were plaintiff in this cause instead of
Continental, a judgment in favor of Cheney, regardless
of his statement that the obligations to banks 1nentioned
in the contract included Continental, certainly would not
stand. Yet the law ~ tnat Continental, as a third-party
beneficiary, is in no better position than Cheney would be,
if Cheney were bringing the action.
The law in this matter is set forth in 17 C.J.S. 1137,
Sec. 519. The text writer there states:
"The rights of a third person to sue on a contract made for his benefit depend on the terms
of the agreement and are no greater than those
gran ted by the con tract as intended by the parties
thereto. To recover the beneficiary must bring
himself within its terms and construction of the
contract is involved. Since recovery on a third
person beneficiary con tract is a recovery on the
contract itself, the right of the beneficiary is no
greater than if the contract were enforced between
the nominal parties, the beneficiary being in no
better position than the promisee." (Citing cases,
footnotes Nos. 70 and 71)
It is inconceivable that a judgment such as the Trial
Court entered in this matter would be sustained if plaintiff in this case had been Cheney instead of Continental.
Appellant calls attention to another rule of law, that
the right of a third person to sue on a contract for his
benefit is subject to a modification of the agreement,
and a discharge of the promisor by the promisee or a
variation of the contract by them, is effective against a
creditor beneficiary, if the creditor does not bring suit
upon the promisee or otherwise materially change his
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position in reliance thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation. 17 C.J.S. 1138, Section 519.
In this case, had appellant desired to plead something which was not exactly true, he could have alleged
that the agreement of December 3rd was a modification
of the agreement of November 30th, and by the terms of
the modification only those obligations "secured by liens
or mortgages upon the real property" (Ex. 3-D) were to
be paid by him. Continental knew nothing of the agreement apparently, and took no action until four months
later. If such agreement were a modification of the
agreement of November 30th, there could be no question
of the non-liability of appellant to Continental. However,
it was not intended as a modification of the agreement
of November 30, 1953, and, therefore, appellant did not
plead it as such not attempt to set it up as a modification. It was merely a clarification of the agreement. It
is noteworthy that Cheney made no attempt to make
any other explanation of that agreement.
Thus, as a matter of law, Continental being in no
better position than Cheney should not be permitted to
recover as against appellant.
For the reasons above stated, appellant submits that
the judgment of the lower court should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,

J. GRANT IVERSON,
Attorney for Appella;nt.
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